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BALANCING ERISA'S ANTI-ALIENATION PROVISIONS
AGAINST GARNISHMENT OF A CONVICTED CRIMINAL'S
RETIREMENTS FUNDS: UNSCRAMBLING THE
APPROACHES TO PROTECTING THE RETIREMENT NEST
EGG*
Alan K. Ragant
In marble walls as white as milk, lined with a skin as soft as silk;
Within a fountain crystal clear, a golden apple doth appear.
No doors there are to this strong-hold. Yet things break in and steal
the gold. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 2
is a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to protect the interests
of employee benefit plan participants and beneficiaries. 3 Pensions
generally are regarded as one of the legs in the three-legged
retirement fund stool, along with social security and personal
savings. 4 Safeguarding the three legs helps prevent impoverishment

*

t

1.
2.
3.
4.

One etymologist explains the origin of the term nest egg as follows: "Before the days
of scientific egg production, farmers would place a fake egg, made of porcelain or
white glass, in the hens' nests, which supposedly encouraged the appearance of more
real eggs. A financial nest egg will, hopefully, lead to the appearance of more
money." ROBERT CLAIBORNE, LOOSE CANNONS, RED HERRINGS, AND OTHER LOST
METAPHORS 165 (1988).
Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. The author expresses
sincere gratitude for the efforts and comments of Professor Patricia E. Dilley of the
University of Florida Levin College of Law and Professors Christopher Roederer and
Susan Harthill of Florida Coastal School of Law, who reviewed an early draft of this
article. A special thank you also goes to the author's able research assistant, Heath
Vickers. Any errors or omissions are the author's.
THE NURSERY RHYMES OF ENGLAND 81 (James Orchard Halliwell ed., London, John
Russell Smith 1846), available at http://www.presscom.co.uk/nursery/nurs4th.html.
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006)).
ERISA§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the ThreeLegged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REv.
938, 939 (2007); John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The
Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 159, 176 (2004);
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in old age, while allowing for varying degrees of maintenance of a
retiree's lifestyle. 5 In support of this concept, one of ERISA's
controversial provisions prohibits assignment or alienation of
retirement plan benefits. 6 Since 1974, the courts and Congress have
wrestled with how to balance the desire to preserve ERISA retirement
funds for ultimate use by participants and their beneficiaries against
equitable claims against such funds brought by third parties. 7
Despite the simplicity and possible allure of a complete bar to the
alienation of pension benefits, it would be unreasonable to prevent
diversion of plan funds for certain situations such as divorce or
criminal activity. In recognition of this balancing of interests,
Congress amended ERISA in 1984 to allow alienation where the
spouse of a pension plan member obtained an order relating to child
support, alimony, or marital property rights under specific
circumstances (Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDR0)). 8
When numerous federal district and appellate courts attempted to
override ERISA' s "anti-alienation" or "spendthrift" provisions in
circumstances involving plan administrators who embezzled from a
plan or otherwise breached fiduciary duties, the Supreme Court
rejected such judicially crafted attacks and stated, "[i]f exceptions to
this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task." 9
Congress responded by amending ERISA in 1997 to allow
assignment and alienation where plan participants are ordered to
reimburse the plan following an adjudication of liability, upon
conviction for malfeasance concerning the plan, or based on a
settlement entered into by the plan participant and the Secretary of
Labor or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for breach of a
fiduciary duty involving the plan. 10
Some recent decisions relied on the federal Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MVRA) 11 as a permissible means of alienating

5.
6.

Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination,
Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REv. 433, 501-{)2 (1987).
Eason, supra note 4, at 176-77.
ERISA§ 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § l056(d) (2006); I.R.C. § 401(a)(l3) (2006) (generally
referred to as either the "anti-alienation" or "spendthrift" clause). See Ablamis v.
Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991).

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part 11.8-C.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)13(g) (as amended in 1988).
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat') Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990), quoted
in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(I3)(C); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)13(t) (as amended in 1988).
18 u.s. c. §§ 3663A, 3664 (2006).

2009]

Balancing ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provisions

65

ERISA pension funds even though the criminal activity bore no
relationship to the victim's retirement. 12 This article looks at
ERISA's anti-alienation provtston, including its history,
interpretation, and application, and addresses arguments for and
against using the MYRA to create an exception to ERISA's antialienation provision. Part I summarizes the background that preceded
the congressional enactment of ERISA, as well as the varied results
reached by courts faced with interpreting the Spendthrift Clause. Part
II looks at the recognized exceptions to ERISA's Spendthrift
Provisions--exceptions that are noncontroversial either because of
their inclusion within ERISA 13 or their generally unquestioned
acceptance by the courts. 14 Part III discusses recent decisions that
have addressed whether the MYRA creates an exception to ERISA's
prohibition against assignment or alienation. Part IV examines the
arguments and policy considerations for and against an MYRA-based
exception to ERISA's spendthrift provisions, concluding that the
competing policy considerations of protecting retirement funds
versus providing restitution reveal that the MYRA is an incomplete
means of balancing the equities of pensioners and victims. Congress
should amend ERISA to incorporate a spendthrift exception for
qualified criminal restitution orders, similar to that which exists for
QDROs. Such a limited carve-out from the anti-alienation provisions
should allow recovery under specific circumstances from the pension
funds of a criminal subject to an order of restitution, regardless of
whether such an order originated in a state or federal prosecution.

12.

13.

14.

See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795-97 (W.D. Mich. 2008); United States v. James, 312
F. Supp. 2d 802, 804-05 (E. D. Va. 2004).
See, e.g., l.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (allowing certain participant
and beneficiary loans, as well as voluntary and revocable assignments of future
benefits not to exceed ten percent of a benefit payment once the benefits are in pay
status, to be included in a qualified trust); see also I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(l3)(B), 414(p); 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(iii) (providing an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions
for QDROs); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (establishing a
spendthrift exception for breaches of fiduciary duty or criminal activity involving the
plan).
See, e.g., Mcintyre v. United States, 222 F.3d 655, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Sawaf, 74 F.3d 119, 122-25 (6th Cir. 1996); Shanbaum v. United States, 32
F.3d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions did not
bar the Internal Revenue Service from levying against an individual's pension plan
assets); United States v. Rogers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785-86 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Events Leading to ERISA-Foxes in the Hen House

Congressional enactment of ERISA in 1974 represented the
culmination of a presidential study commissioned twelve years
earlier. 15 In a March 28, 1962 memorandum establishing the
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private
Retirement and Welfare Programs, President John F. Kennedy
provided no direct indication of the turbulent economic events
The President's
prompting the Committee's formation. 16
memorandum merely alluded to his frrst Economic Report to
Congress, delivered in January 1962, which called for a "reappraisal
of legislation" governing corporate pension funds and other private
retirement programs, 17 and charged the Committee "to review
legislation and administrative practice relating to [private retirement]
programs." 18 The economic setting was known only too well to the
executive, Congress, Committee members, and the nation at large,
but dire events were unfolding even as the Committee commenced its
work. 19
For a decade and a half following the end of World War II, the
United States avoided a major economic depression but suffered four
recessions. 20 Measures for strengthening the fmancial system--and
consequently the economy-included scrutiny of and change to the
nation's private retirement systems. 21 In 1963, during what might be
described as America's worst pension crisis since American Express

15.
16.

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

William J. Chadwick & David S. Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The
Quest for Parity, 28 VAND. L. REv. 641, 668 (1975).
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT
AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS app. C
(President's Memo dated Mar. 28, 1962) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office 1965) (hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM.].
Economic Report of the President, 1962 EcoN. REP. PRES. 3, 23 (Jan. 1962).
PRESIDENT's COMM., supra note 16, at app. C. The memorandum also directed the
Committee to review "the implications of the growing retirement and welfare funds
for the financial structure of the economy, as well as ... the role and character of the
private pension and other retirement systems in the economic security system of the
nation," and to consider "how they may contribute more effectively to efficient
manpower utilization and mobility." Id
JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A
POLITICAL HISTORY 73-87 (2004).
Economic Report of the President, supra note 17, at 4.
/d. at 17,21-25.
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created the country's first pension system in 1875/2 StudebakerPackard closed its South Bend, Indiana plant and terminated its
employee pension plan. 23 Over 4,000 workers, ranging from forty to
sixty years old, lost roughly eighty-five percent of the value of their
vested retirement benefits. 24 Another low point during the 1960s and
1970s occurred when the Teamsters Union misused tens of millions
of dollars in the Central States pension funds amid allegations of
improper investments and organized criminal activity. 25 Although the
1960s ushered in a new era of hope, as demonstrated in the
President's Economic Report to Congress, much remained to be
done. 26
Hearings were being conducted on Capitol Hill, but legislation was
slow in coming. In 1967, Senator Jacob Javits introduced a pension
reform bill that would evolve into ERISA. 27 After years of surveys,
studies, reports, and hearings-and against significant opposition
from business and labor groups-ERISA was enacted and signed into
law on Labor Day 1974. 28 Although ERISA's initial focus primarily
involved pension plans, over the next several decades, Congress
amended ERISA to cover other retirement vehicles, as well as health
and welfare benefit plans. 29 With regard to covered retirement plans,
22.

23.

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Patrick W. Sebum, Evolution of Employer-Provided Defined Benefit Pensions, 114
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16, 16-17 (1991) (citing I MURRAY W. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL
PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 21-22 (1932)).
S. REP. No. 93-383, at 78-79 (1973); Private Pension Plans: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 103-106, 123
(1966) (statement of Clifford M. MacMillan, Vice President, Studebaker
Corporation).

/d.
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE DEPT. OF LABOR'S OVERSIGHT OF THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE TEAMSTERS' CENTRAL STATES PENSION AND HEALTH AND
WELFARE FUNDS app. I, 2-3 (1985); see also Mary Williams Walsh, Teamsters Find
Pensions at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at AI ("In the 1960's and 1970's, the
Teamsters' huge Central States pension fund was a wellspring of union corruption.
Tens of millions of dollars were loaned to racketeers who used the money to gain
control of Las Vegas casinos. Administrative jobs were awarded to favored insiders
who paid themselves big fees. A former Teamster president and pension trustee was
convicted of trying to bribe a United States senator.").
Economic Report of the President, supra note 17, at 3-4.
Pension and Employee Benefit Act of 1967, § 1103, 90th Cong. (1967).
See WooTEN, supra note 19, at 241-70.
See generally Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96364, 94 Stat. 1210 (1980); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
95 Stat. 172 ( 1981 ); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98
Stat. 494 (1984); Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426
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ERISA's extensive rules include standards of conduct for fiduciaries,
reporting and disclosure provisions, and measures aimed at protecting
plan funds and ensuring the ultimate receipt of funds by qualified
participants and beneficiaries. 30

B.

The Spendthrift Provision's Deceptively Simple Language and
Vague Underlying Policy-Well-Hidden Eggs

According to the legislative findings codified in ERISA's initial
section, the congressional rationale for enactment included a
determination that "the continued well-being and security of millions
of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee
benefit] plans." 31 As part of the comprehensive rules regulating
employee benefits, the statute contains a provision relating to antialienation, which specifies that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated."32 A corresponding provision in I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A)
states that "[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under [I.R.C.
§ 401] unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."33
Neither ERISA nor the related I.R.C. sections supply meanings for
the terms "assign" or "alienate." Instead, Treasury Regulations
collectively defme "'assignment' and 'alienation"' to include
payment of the employee's plan benefits to the employer and any
arrangement by a participant or beneficiary giving his or her interest

30.
31.
32.
33.

(1984); Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986); Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 237 (1986); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
29 u.s.c. §§ 1021, 1082, 1103, 1104 (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2006).
29 u.s.c. § 1056(d)(1) (2006).
I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(A)(2006). The Code continues:
For purposes of the preceding sentence, there shall not be taken
into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to
exceed I 0 percent of any benefit payment made by a participant
who is receiving benefits under the plan unless the assignment or
alienation is made for purposes of defraying plan administration
costs. For purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant
or beneficiary shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if
such loan is secured by the participant's accrued nonforfeitable
benefit and is exempt from the tax imposed by section 4975
(relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason of section
4975(d)(l).
!d.
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in any part of the plan to a third party. 34 The regulations also list five
arrangements that will not fall within the rubric of assignment or
alienation35 and two general categories of exceptions to the
proscription against assignment or alienation. 36
The statute and legislative history yield almost no clues as to the
intent behind ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The Report of the
House Ways and Means Committee contains only a limited reference
to alienation in its explanation of the statute's provisions:
To further ensure that the employee's accrued benefits are
actually available for retirement purposes, the committee
bill also contains a provision requiring the plan to provide
that benefits may not be assigned or alienated. (Of course,
this provision is not intended to prevent the transfer of
benefit rights from one qualified plan to another.Y 7
Since 1974, ERISA's anti-alienation provisions have undergone
significant legislative modification, while the courts and governing
agencies have struggled to defme the correct parameters of antialienation. 38

34.
35.

36.

37.
38.

Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(c)(l) (as amended in 1988).
Treas. Reg. § 1.40l(a)-13(c)(2) (excluding the following "[s]pecific arrangements"
from '"assignment' and 'alienation"': federal, state, or local tax withholdings on
benefit payments; recovery of overpayments; transfer of benefit rights between plans;
direct deposit of benefit payments; and recapture of certain payments).
Treas. Reg. § 1.40l(a)-13(d) (exempting from the rule against assignment and
alienation (1) a voluntary, revocable assignment by a beneficiary or participant
receiving payments of not more than ten percent in the aggregate of any future
payment provided that the assignment is not to defray plan administration costs, and
(2) benefits alienated or assigned as security for plan loans under certain conditions).
H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 68 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4734.
See generally Dana M. Muir, Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee
Benefit Programs: Boomers, Benefits, and Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1351,
1389-1405 (1997) (explaining that interpretation of ERISA's prohibition against
assignment and alienation has "proven far more difficult than the relatively simple
sounding description indicates").
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Following the enactment of ERISA, federal courts wrestled in
general with interpreting and applying such a comprehensive statute,
and in particular with the Act's prohibition on assignment and
alienation. The paucity of legislative guidance on the meaning and
Cl ntours of assignment or alienation raised questions as to whether
pension plan funds could be reached by bankruptcy creditors,40
victims of criminal misconduct, 41 spouses and former spouses, 42 or a
plan itself to recover from a breaching fiduciary. 43 Not surprisingly,
39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE

111-12
(London,
MacMillan
&
Co.
1872),
available
at
http://www. sabian.orglAlice/lgchap05.htm:
"I should like to buy an egg, please," she said timidly.
"How do you sell them?"
"Fivepence farthing for one-twopence for two," the Sheep
replied.
"Then two are cheaper than one?" Alice said in a surprised
tone, taking out her purse.
"Only you must eat them both, if you buy two," said the
Sheep.
"Then I'll have one, please," said Alice, as she put the
money down on the counter. For she thought to herself, "They
mightn't be at all nice, you know."
The Sheep took the money, and put it away in a box: then
she said "I never put things into people's hands-that would
never do-you must get it for yourself." And so saying, she went
off to the other end of the shop, and set the egg upright on a she!£
"I wonder why it wouldn't do?'' thought Alice, as she
groped her way among the tables and chairs, for the shop was
very dark towards the end. "The egg seems to get further away
the morel walk towards it."
Id. (emphasis added).
·Compare In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669, 674 (lOth Cir. 1991) (concluding that ERISA
exempted pension funds from bankruptcy estate), with In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352,
1360 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the argument that ERISA's anti-alienation provision
barred inclusion of debtor's pension funds in bankruptcy).
Ellis Nat'! Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 470-71 (2d Cir.
1986) (analyzing, but refusing to adopt, a "criminal misconduct" exception to
ERISA's prohibition on assigrunent or alienation).
Compare Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 88 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(holding that ERISA did not provide a cause of action for a non-employee spouse's
claim against a retirement fund), with Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1156
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (reasoning that in passing ERISA, Congress did not intend to
"insulate a breadwinner from the valid support claims of spouse and offspring").
Compare St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir. 1985)
(characterizing theft from pension fund as basis for an equitable exception to ERISA's
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the federal judiciary divided into two camps. One view held that the
proper role of the courts included application of equity in certain
situations to create exceptions to ERISA's broad anti-alienation
language. As expressed by the Eleventh Circuit: "There is no reason
to conclude that ERISA requires the abrogation of the equitable
principle that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his misdeeds." 44
The opposing view regarded protection of an employee's pension as
the "fundamental" congressional objective. In addition to the
difficulty in deciding which litigants to exempt from the antialienation rule, one appeals court concluded that "even a narrow
judicially created 'criminal misconduct' exception would undermine,
rather than promote, the stability of the pension plan and its employee
members by creating uncertainty and potentially delayed receipt or
non-receipt of promised benefits."45
In 1990 the Supreme Court concluded that ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions protected a union official's pension benefits from
equitable attack even though the official was convicted of embezzling
union funds. 46 Curtis Guidry, a union chief executive officer and
pension fund trustee, pleaded guilty to pocketing close to $400,000 in
union pension money. 47
Although ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions precluded garnishment of pension funds, the district court
reasoned that by reading ERISA in pari materia with section 501(c)
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 48
the damage to the union pension fund caused by Guidry's "knavery"
justified an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation requirement. 49 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision and upheld the constructive trust imposed by

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.

non-alienation provision), with Vink v. SHY N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp.
268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to recognize a fraud exception to ERISA's antialienation provision that would enable a company to attach a defrauding employee's
pension fund). See also Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'! Pension Fund, 493
U.S. 365, 376-77 (1990), superseded by statute, Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, II 0 Stat. 1227 ( 1996); Crawford v. La Boucherie
Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 752 F.2d at 552.
Ellis Nat 'I Bank, 786 F.2d at 471.
Guidry, 493 U.S. at 367, 376.
/d. at 367.
Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 501(c), 73 Stat. 536 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)
(2006)) ("Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities,
property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or by which
he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.").
Guidry, 493 U.S. at 370.
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the district court on Guidry's undistributed pension benefits. 50 The
appellate court deemed it unlikely that Congress intended courts to
ignore "'equitable principles'" and thereby shield individuals such as
Guidry from being fiscally accountable for their misdeeds. 51
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and observed
that ERISA' s anti-alienation provision "reflects a considered
congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of
income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and
perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents others
from securing relief for the wrongs done them. " 52 Rejecting the
practicability of defming equitable exceptions to ERISA's antialienation that would not "swallow the rule," the Court stated "that
the identification of any exception should be left to Congress."53 The
Court neglected to address the obvious difficulty in expecting
legislators to fashion prospective anti-alienation exceptions when the
judiciary arguably would be better equipped to tailor remedies in
individual cases based on specific facts and circumstances. 54 The
Court's observation that "[i]t makes little sense to adopt such a policy
and then to refuse enforcement whenever enforcement appears
inequitable" 55 raises the possibility that even if Congress amended
ERISA's anti-alienation language to give courts the discretion to craft
equitable exceptions, such legislatively-granted leeway might be
impermissibly vague. 56
Two years after the Guidry decision, the Court again decided a case
involving alienation in the context of ERISA. In Patterson v.
Shumate, 57 the issue centered on the interaction between ERISA and
the Bankruptcy Code; specifically, whether ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions were a transfer restriction "enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law" 58 such that the debtor could exclude his interest

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

!d.
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'! Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1460 (lOth Cir.
1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990)).
Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376.
!d. at 377.
See, e.g., Crawford v. La Boucherie Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376-77.
See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158-59 (1974) (discussing constitutional
challenges to a noncriminal statute based on overbreadth and vagueness).
504 U.S. 753 (1992).
The Bankruptcy Code places trust property subject to transfer restrictions outside the
bankruptcy estate: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in
a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 54l(c)(2) (2006).
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in a pension plan from the bankruptcy estate. 59 During a period
spanning more than 30 years, Joseph B. Shumate, Jr., rose through
the ranks at Coleman Furniture Company to become its president,
chairman of the board of directors, and majority shareholder. 60 After
Coleman Furniture's bankruptcy proceeding was converted from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, Shumate began experiencing personal
financial difficulties, eventually resulting in his own Chapter 7
filing. 61 The trustee of Shumate's bankruptcy estate sought to compel
Coleman Furniture's bankruptcy trustee to tum over Shumate's
$250,000 interest in Coleman Furniture's pension plan to Shumate's
bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of Shumate's creditors. 62 Writing
for the Court as he had in Guidry, Justice Blackmun once more
focused on ERISA's statutory language that "'[e]ach pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated. "' 63
In reconciling the applicable ERISA and Bankruptcy Code
terminology, the Court paid little attention to ERISA's policies other
than to reiterate that Congress intended to safeguard pension
income. 64 The Justices failed to address ERISA's countervailing goal
of preventing the manipulation of pension funds by the wealthy. 65
The narrow question focused on by the Court-the degree to which
ERISA's anti-alienation language could be read to protect all pension
assets--obscured consideration of the more fundamental question of
the degree to which pension trusts, particularly those representing
sums well beyond an individual's basic needs in retirement, should
be protected. 66 Although Patterson settled the debate on whether
ERISA pension plans formed part of the debtor's estate in
bankruptcy, the Court's use of the misnomer "ERISA-qualified
plans"67 added to the confusion and may have played a role in
obscuring the fundamental policy underpinnings of whether and to
what extent a pension fund should be insulated from the reach of
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.

Patterson, 504 U.S. at 755, 757.
/d. at 755; Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 363 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 504 U.S.
753 (1992).
Patterson, 504 U.S. at 755.
/d. at 755-56.
!d. at 759 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(J) (2006)).
!d. at 764-65. The Court also rejected the need to consider the legislative history of
the relevant bankruptcy provision, finding such analysis obviated by "the clarity of the
statutory language at issue .... " /d. at 761.
Patricia Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors, 74 IND.
L.J. 355, 387 (1999).
/d. at 386-87.
Patterson, 504 U.S. 753.
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third parties. 68 One scholar observed that by framing the decision on
the Bankruptcy Code, the Court "inevitably precluded consideration
of the underlying question of whether, and how best, to protect
debtors from impoverishment in old age. " 69 By focusing primarily on
statutory language and eschewing any in-depth examination of
ERISA's policies, the Court actually undermined the balance
between protecting retirement assets and compensating innocent
victims or creditors. 70 The decision also averted scrutiny of the
fundamental precept of why pension funds should be shielded from
creditors at all. 71
Over the next several years, the Court granted certiorari in two
more cases to resolve continuing questions as to the reach of
ERISA's anti-alienation rules. 72 Of the two decisions, the more
recent is less controversial. In Kennedy v. Plan Adm 'r for DuPont ·
Sav. & Inv. Plan, 73 a unanimous Court determined that ERISA's antialienation provision did not "invalidate" a divorced spouse's nonQDRO waiver of benefits under her ex-spouse's pension plan. 74
Instead, because the plan specified the procedure by which the
divorced spouse could waive entitlement to her ex-spouse's pension
benefits, the plan administrator correctly disregarded the non-QDRO
waiver as inconsistent with the plan documents. 75 In Boggs v.
Boggs/6 the issue was whether ERISA preempted the testamentary
transfer of a community property interest in an undistributed pension

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.

See In re Baker, 114 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the "mysterious"
provenance of the term "ERISA-qualified").
Dilley, supra note 65, at 385 (emphasis added).
Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates ofPension Protection: Amending the Anti-Alienation
Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REv. 379, 430-35 {2001).
Dilley, supra note 65, at 387.
See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009);
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). The Supreme Court mentioned ERISA's antialienation provision in two other post-Shumate opinions, but the provision was not
part of the Court's analysis. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rei. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141
(2001), the lower court included a discussion of anti-alienation under ERISA, but the
Supreme Court focused its analysis on preemption and did not address assignment or
alienation. Id at 145-46. In Raymond B. Yates, MD., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004), the Court noted that the plan in question complied with
the anti-alienation provisions of I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056{d)(l), but
alienation was not a factor in the Court's determination that a business's working
owner qualified under ERISA as a participant in a pension plan if the business
employed at least one other person who was not the owner's spouse. Id at 8.
129 S. Ct. 865.
!d. at 868.

n.

M

,

76.

520 U.S. 833 (1997).

}

2009]

Balancing ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provisions

75

plan by the nonparticipant spouse. 77 Isaac Boggs was employed by
South Central Bell (Bell) from 1949 to 1985, during which time he
participated in various Bell system retirement plans. 78 Isaac and his
wife Dorothy were married during the entire period of his
employment with Bell until Dorothy died in 1979. 79 Dorothy
bequeathed to Isaac the equivalent of a life estate in her community
property interest in Isaac's pension benefits, with the remainder to the
couple's three children. 80 Isaac remarried within a year of Dorothy's
death, worked for five more years, and died four years later. 81 Upon
Isaac's death, his second wife contested Dorothy's attempted
testamentary transfer of her community property interest in Isaac's
pension benefits to Isaac and Dorothy's children, contending that
Dorothy's putative bequest to the children was preempted by
ERISA. 82 The district court and a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit
upheld the transfer. 83
In a controversial decision, 84 a divided Supreme Court reasoned
that ERISA mandated uniformity of pension benefit treatment
regardless of state property laws. 85 Although much of the majority
opinion in Boggs dealt with ERISA's preemption of Louisiana
common law, 86 the Court buttressed its conclusions with a discussion
of ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 87 The Court noted that the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 amended ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions to provide an exception for qualified domestic relations
orders (QDROs). 88 Because the statute created an exception to anti-

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

/d. at 835-36.
/d. at 836.
!d.
/d. at 836-37.
/d. at 836.
!d. at 837. The retirement assets in controversy included an annuity of approximately
$1,800 per month, 96 shares of AT&T stock from Bell's employee stock ownership
plan (ESOP), and a lump-sum distribution of approximately $150,000 from Bell's
Savings Plan for Salaried Employees that Isaac rolled over into an individual
retirement account (IRA) upon his retirement from Bell. !d. at 836; id. at 856 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
!d. at 837-38.
See Heather J. Rose, Comment, Boggs v. Boggs: Creating Real-Life Cinderellas, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 271,271 (1999) (casting the second wife in the role ofthe wicked
stepmother in a fairy tale).
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 839-41.
!d. at 841-44.
/d. at 851-52.
/d. at 843, 846-47. As discussed more fully below, a QDRO is a judgment or order
that provides child support, alimony, or marital property rights, that has been issued
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alienation for QDROs, the majority essentially applied the statutory
construction maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 89 without
characterizing it as such, to reach the conclusion that Congress
intended to exclude all other formulations:
The surviving spouse annuity and QDRO provisions, which
acknowledge and protect specific pension plan community
property interests, give rise to the strong implication that
other community property claims are not consistent with the
statutory scheme. ERISA's silence with respect to the right
of a nonOparticipant spouse to control pension plan benefits
by testamentary transfer provides powerful support for the
conclusion that the right does not exist. 90
Although the majority opinion in Boggs avoided labeling the
maxim, reliance on the doctrine's concept is at odds with the Court's
less than favorable comments a decade earlier in a securities fraud
case:
We also reject application of the maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius ... As we
stated in SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-351, 64 S.
Ct. 120, 123, 88 L. Ed. 88 (1943), such canons 'long have
been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe
the details of an act in conformity with its dominating
general purpose' ... We believe the maxim cannot properly
be applied to a situation where the remedies redress
different misconduct and where the remedial purposes of the
Acts would be undermined by a presumption of
exclusivity. 91

89.
90.
91.

pursuant to a state's domestic relations laws, and that meets specific statutory
requirements set forth in I.R.C. § 414(p) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). Id
See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988) ("[T]he expression
of one is the exclusion of others .... ").
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847-48.
Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983) (citations
omitted); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
282 (1985) ("The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius is ... based on the
assumption of legislative omniscience, because it would make sense only if all
omissions in legislative drafting were deliberate. Although this canon seemed dead
for a while, it has been resurrected by the Supreme Court to provide a basis for
refusing to create private remedies for certain statutory violations. Its recent
disparagement by a unanimous Court [in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston] puts its
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The majority in Boggs likely would contend that it construed
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions in conformity with ERISA's
general purpose of protecting pension accounts. The dissent and
some commentators would disagree. 92
In a dissent joined fully by Justice O'Connor and in part by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer pointed out
the inequity of the Court's decision. 93 If Dorothy had divorced Isaac
shortly before her death and obtained a QDRO, the terms of her will
would have been honored and the couple's children would have
received their mother's interest in Isaac's pension upon Isaac's
death. 94
The dissent also explained in detail why ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions did not mandate the result reached by the majority. 95 First,
ERISA only barred assignment or alienation of pension benefits. 96
Dorothy obtained her ownership interest in Isaac's pension through
Louisiana's community property laws, not through assignment or
Second, because Dorothy and Isaac owned the
alienation. 97
retirement assets equally as community property, Dorothy had as
much right as Isaac to direct the disposition of her property at her
death. 98 ERISA had no effect on what a pension fund beneficiary did
with the pension funds after death "for after the death of a beneficiary
the money is no longer needed for that beneficiary's support." 99
Third, the dissent addressed the conclusion that when Congress
amended ERISA to exempt QDROs from the bar against alienation, it
rendered all other orders ineffectual. 100 By its terms, the QDRO
future in some doubt but more likely confirms that judicial use of canons of
construction is opportunistic.").
92.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Cynthia A. Samuel &
Katherine S. Spaht, Fixing What's Broke: Amending ERISA to Allow Community
Property to Apply Upon the Death of a Participant's Spouse, 35 FAM. L.Q. 425, 42627 (2001); Erica S. Phillips, Comment, Equality in Life, Inequality in Death: The
Ramifications of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34
IDAHO L. REv. 623, 625 (1998); Tony Vecino, Note, Boggs v. Boggs: State
Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERISA 's Mire, 28 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 571,599 (1998).
93.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94.
ld. at 868.
95.
ld. at 863-68.
96. 29 u.s.c. § 1056(d)(J) (2006).
97.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
98.
ld. at 865. Under Louisiana law, even though Dorothy predeceased Isaac, any
testamentary transfer would take effect only following an accounting after Isaac's
death. See id.
99. !d. at 864-65.
100. See id. at 866-67.
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amendment was concerned only with the treatment of domestic
relations orders that were "qualified" under the terms provided in the
statute. 101 Congress gave no indication that its amendment would
affect other orders, such as those entered in probate, that did not
assign or alienate pension benefits. 102
As might be expected, the exclusion of equity from statutory
applications sometimes produces inequitable results. The strict
reading mandated by the Supreme Court has not produced
predictability, but instead has produced results that even the Court
has recognized as "distaste[ful]." 103
III. EXAMINING NONCONTROVERSIAL ANTI-ALIENATION
EXCEPTIONS
A.

Exceptions to Anti-Alienation Specifically Within the Spendthrift
Provisions-Borrowing an Egg

When Congress enacted ERISA, the statute included two
exceptions to the prohibition on alienation: (1) a participant or
beneficiary could borrow against her accrued non-forfeitable
benefit, 104 and (2) a pension recipient could voluntarily assign up to
ten percent of a benefit payment, as long as the assignment was
revocable and not made to defray plan administration costs. 105 The
limited legislative history supporting the voluntary revocable
assignment and loan exceptions provides that:
Under the conference substitute, a plan must provide that
benefits under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.
However, the plan may provide that after a benefit is in pay
status, there may be a voluntary revocable assignment (not
to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment) by an
employee which is not for purposes of defraying the
administrative costs of the plan. For purposes of this rule, a
garnishment or levy is not to be considered a voluntary
assignment. Vested benefits may be used as collateral for

101.
102.
103.
104.

Boggs, 520 U.S. at 866--67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 867.
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'! Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 377 (1990).
I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(A) (2006); see also Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(d)(2) (as amended
in 1988).
105. I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(A); see also Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(d)(l).
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reasonable loans from a plan, where the fiduciary
requirements ofthe law are not violated. 106
Over the next two decades, Congress supplemented these two
exceptions with ERISA amendments that provide exceptions for
orders entered in domestic relations actions 107 and judgments based
on breach of fiduciary duty as to pension plans. 108
1.

Participant Loans-Fashionable, Glittering Eggs 109

Within a few years of ERISA's initial enactment, which included
an anti-alienation exception for loans made to plan participants,
Congress became concerned that widespread use of such loans could
adversely affect retirement savings. 110 Balanced against this concern
was the recognition that a blanket prohibition against loans might
deter non-highly compensated employees from participating in
retirement savings programs. 111 As originally enacted, ERISA
required that plan loans state a reasonable interest rate, be adequately
secured, establish a sound repayment schedule, and be available in a
manner not discriminating against rank-and-file workers. 112 These
requirements have been and continue to be augmented by other
limitations such as the rule stating that the amounts received from a
pension plan as a loan will be taxed as a distribution unless the
conditions in I.R.C. § 72(p) and the applicable regulations are met. 113
With the addition of§ 72(p) through the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Congress created a
presumption that plan loans constituted taxable distributions unless
the loan met specific requirements relating to loan balance 114 and

H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 280 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5061.
107. l.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(B).
108. l.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (2006).
109. See F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 22 (Eleanor Lanahan et al. eds.,
Scribner 1992) ( 1925) ("Across the courtesy bay the white palaces of fashionable East
Egg glittered along the water .... ").
110. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, H.R. Doc. No. 97-4961,
at 294-95 (1982).
Ill. !d.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(l) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.40l(a)(4)-4(a), -4(e)(l)(i), 4(e)(3)(iii)(A) (as amended in 1988).
113. See I.R.C. § 72(p) (2006); Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-l (2009); see also I.R.C. § 4975(d)(l)
(2006) (providing an exception to the prohibited transaction rules for participant
loans).
114. l.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(A), (D).
106.
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repayment terms. 115 Labor and Treasury Regulations further refmed
and clarified areas such as maximum loan amounts 116 and loan
agreement formalities. 117 Failure to comply with the statutory and
regulatory mandates in either form or operation may result in a
deemed distribution of the full loan balance, including accrued
interest. 118 In addition to a tax on the distribution, the plan participant
risks an additional ten percent early distribution tax. 119 Despite the
stringent rules and possible tax implications for pension plan loans,
allowing a participant to borrow against these funds provides
significant flexibility and control over plan benefits prior to
retirement.
2. Ten Percent Limit on Alienation of Benefits in Pay StatusKeeping Most of the Eggs in the Baskee 20
As part of ERISA's original framework, Congress included a cap
on the amount of benefits in pay status that may be alienated. 121
Section 401(a)(13)(A) allows participants receiving benefits to assign
up to ten percent of their benefit payment if the assignment is
voluntary, revocable, and not used for plan administration costs. 122 If
strictly applied, this requirement seems somewhat paternalistic and
formal-once a participant is receiving benefits, it is difficult to
justify the government's interest in how the money is spent, let alone
its enforcement of such restrictions. One author posits that Congress
possibly intended this to be a protection "in perpetuity'' that gives
some latitude to the pension recipient "while restricting the pensioner
and other possible third party claimants from pouncing on the
payments at a time when the retiree needs [them] most." 123 Several
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.

121.
122.
123.

I.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(B)-{C).
See 29 C.P.R.§ 2550.408b-1(c)(1)-(3), (f) (2008).
Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A (3)(b).
Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A (3), (10)(b), (11)(a), (14), (15).
I.R.C. § 72(t)(1). I.R.C. § 72(m) imposes an additional tax for certain key employees
who are "5-percent owner[s]" of the business, as defined in I.R.C. § 416(i)(1)(B)(i).
Treas. Reg.§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A (11).
See MARK TWAIN, THE TRAGEDY OF PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 197 (1894) available at
http://etext.lib. virginia.edu/railton/wilson/facsimile/twapu197.jpg ("Behold, the fool
saith, 'Put not all thine eggs in the one basket'-which is but a manner of saying,
'Scatter your money and attention;' but the wise man saith, 'Put all your eggs in the
one basket and-WATCH THAT BASKET.'").
ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 206(d), 88 Stat. 829, 864-65 (1974); 29 U.S.C. §
1506(d)(2) (2006); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (2006).
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1506(d)(2).
Reece, supra note 70, at 392.
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courts have interpreted the provisions as a prohibition only on the
alienation ofundistributed funds. 124
3.

Qualified Domestic Relations Orders-Tending the Egg 125

In its original form, ERISA provided no anti-alienation exception
for orders awarding child support or alimony payments. Although
many courts fashioned exceptions for domestic relations orders, 126
under a strict reading of the statute such orders constituted an
attempted assignment or alienation of pension benefits contrary to
and preempted by ERISA. 127 Ten years after ERISA's enactment,
Congress added an exception for orders entered in domestic relations
actions 128 based on its observation that the interpretive case law
revealed a lack ofuniformity:
Generally, under present law, benefits under a pens10n,
profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan (pension plan) are
subject to prohibitions against assignment or alienation
(spendthrift provisions.)
Under present law, certain
provisions of ERISA supersede (preempt) State laws
relating to pension, etc., plans. A plan that does not include
these required spendthrift provisions is not a qualified plan
under the Code, and State law permitting such an
assignment or alienation is generally preempted by ERISA.
Several cases have arisen in which courts have been
required to determine whether the ERISA preemption and
spendthrift provisions apply to family support obligations
(e.g., alimony, separate maintenance, and child support

124.

125.
126.
127.

128.

See Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004); Robbins v. DeBuono, 218
F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2000); Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v.
Howell, 227 F.3d 672, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2000); Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905,
919-21 (9th Cir. 2000); Trucking Employees of N.J. Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Colville,
16 F.3d 52, 54-56 (3d Cir. 1994). But see United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 68284 (4th Cir. 1995).
See DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 22 (1940) ("No matter WHAT happens,
This egg must be tended!").
See, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1979).
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 460-61 (6th Cir. 1980) (comparing
decisions that differed in their conclusions as to whether ERlSA's anti-alienation
provision preempted garnishment or attachment in situations including family support
obligations).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2006); see also I.R.C. § 414(p)(l)(B)(i) (2006). The term
"domestic relations order" encompasses formal court approval of property settlement
agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii).
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obligations). In some of these cases, the courts have held
that ERISA was not intended to preempt State domestic
relations law permitting the attachment of vested benefits
for the purpose of meeting these obligations. Some courts
have held that the ERISA preemption provision does not
prevent application of State law permitting attachment of
nonvested benefits for the purpose of meeting family
support obligations. There is a divergence of opinion
among the courts as to whether ERISA preempts State
community property laws insofar as they relate to the rights
of a married couple to benefits under a pension, etc., plan. 129
In rectifying the dilemma created by the courts' diverging opinions,
the Senate Finance Committee recognized the importance of
"establish[ing] guidelines for determining whether the exception to
the spendthrift rules applies," and indicated that the QDRO
amendment was "necessary to ensure that only those orders that are
excepted from the spendthrift provisions are not preempted by
ERISA." 130
Against this backdrop, Congress created detailed criteria that must
be met for a QDRO to escape ERISA's prohibition on alienation or
assignment. 131 A threshold determination entails a characterization of
five aspects of the order: ( 1) type-whether it is a judgment, decree,
or order; 132 (2) subject--concerning child support, alimony, or martial
property rights; 133 (3) parties-spouses, former spouses, children, or
other dependents; 134 (4) legal basis-issued under a state's domestic
relations law; 135 and (5) effect--creating, recognizing, or assigning
pension benefit rights to an alternate payee. 136 By satisfying the
preceding five criteria, a legal document is considered a "domestic
relations order." 137 To become a qualified domestic relations order,
ERISA requires inclusion of specific information such as the
identities and mailing addresses of the plan participant and each

129. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 18-19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2564-65
(citation omitted).
130. ld. at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2565.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(3)(A)-(E).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B) (2006).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)(i).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)(i).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)(ii).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(A)(i).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B).
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alternate payee whose rights are affected by the order; 138 the amount,
percentage, or method for determining the benefits to be paid to each
alternate payee; 139 the period or number of payments covered; 140 and
identification of the plans affected. 141 Moreover, the order will not be
qualified if it modifies the type, form, or amount of an alternate
payee's benefits in a manner inconsistent with the plan or, in certain
respects, with a previous QDR0. 142
Despite the apparent rigidity of the statutory text for QDROs, in
practice the requirements have become somewhat malleable.
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions apply to pension benefits, but not
welfare benefits. 143 A QDRO is an exception to ERISA's antialienation provisions and therefore should be limited in applicability
to pension benefits. Several courts have expanded the anti-alienation
requirements to include welfare benefits in domestic relations cases,
typically where life insurance is concerned. 144 Other courts have
gone so far as to dispense with strict compliance with the statutory
QDRO requirements. 145 Recently, a district court treated a restraining
order as a QDRO, while acknowledging that the order "fail[ed] to
meet every one of[the statutory] requirements." 146

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(A).
29 U.S. C.§ 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(B).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iii); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(C).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iv); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2)(D).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D); I.R.C. § 414(p)(3). The Pension Protection Act of 2006
directed the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations clarifying, among other
things, circumstances in which a domestic relations order could be considered a
QDRO even though it is issued after or revises another QDRO. Pension Protection
Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 1001, 120 Stat. 780, 1052-53 (2006) (codified at
29 C.F.R. § 2530.206 (2008)).
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (stating that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that
benefits under the plan may not be assigned or alienated") (emphasis added).
ERISA's framework distinguishes between two types of benefits: (l) "pension,"
which pertains to retirement income, and (2) "welfare," which relates to items such as
health insurance, vacation benefits, training, day care, scholarship funds, and prepaid
legal services. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006), with 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)
(2006).
144. See, e.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Howell, 227 F.3d 672, 67879 (6th Cir. 2000); Carland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114, 1119 (lOth Cir.
1991).
145. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415,422 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that
substantial compliance with ERISA's QDRO requirements is sufficient); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d l 080, I 085 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[i]t is asking
too much of domestic relations lawyers and judges to expect them to dot every i and
cross every tin formulating divorce decrees that have ERISA implications").
146. Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Phanor, 472 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D. Mass. 2007).
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Fiduciary Breach ofTrust-Faithless Egg-Sitters 147

Seven years after the Supreme Court's decision in Guidry, 148 the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 added an anti-alienation exception to
ERISA for claims against a pension plan based on breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the plan. 149 Recognizing that "[c]ourts have
been divided in their interpretation of the prohibition on assignment
or alienation" in situations where a pension plan suffered from a
participant's criminal conduct or breach of fiduciary duty, Congress
amended ERISA to allow an offset against the participant's plan
benefits. 150 The amendment permits reimbursement of a plan from a
participant's pension benefits only upon conviction of a crime
involving the plan, 151 a civil judgment for breach of ERISA's
fiduciary provisions, 152 or settlement between the participant and the
I47.

I48.

149.
I50.

I 51.
I52.

See DR. SEUss, supra note I25, at 4 ('"Very well,' said the elephant, 'since you insist
.... You want a vacation. Go fly off and take it. I'll sit on your egg and I'll try not
to break it. I'll stay and be faithful. I mean what I say.' 'Toodle-oo!' sang out
·
Mayzie and fluttered away.").
See discussion supra Part II. C. In Guidry, the Court noted that although the convicted
union official embezzled union funds, he "has not been found to have breached any
fiduciary duty to the pension plans." 493 U.S. at 373. Accordingly, the Court did not
reach the question of whether a fiduciary's personal liability for plan losses that
resulted from his breach constituted an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions that would allow recovery from the fiduciary's own plan benefits. Jd at
372-73 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (relating to fiduciary personal
liability) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (2006) (regarding anti-alienation)).
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. I 05-34, § 1502, Ill Stat. 788, I 058-61;
I.R.C. § 40I(a)(I3)(C)(i) (2005); 29 U.S.C. § 1506(d)(4)(A)-(B) (2006).
H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 756-57 (1997) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that "[s]ome courts
have ruled that there is no exception in ERISA for the offset of a participant's benefit
to make a plan whole in the case of a fiduciary breach," while "[o]ther courts have
reached a different result and permitted an offset of a participant's benefit for breach
of fiduciary duties").
29 U.S.C. § I056(d)(4)(A)(i); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(I3)(C)(i)(I) (2005).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(A)(ii); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(I3)(C)(i)(II). The statute technically
might allow alienation of plan benefits even if the judgment is not based on a breach
of fiduciary obligations to a plan. As written, the civil judgment provision merely
requires that the judgment be "entered by a court in an action brought in connection
with a violation (or alleged violation) of part 4 of subtitle B of title I of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of I974 [(i.e., the fiduciary provisions of ERISA title
1)]." I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l3)(C)(i)(II) (emphasis added). Thus, if a multi-count complaint
is brought against a plan fiduciary, but the ERISA count is dismissed or otherwise
fails to form the basis for the defendant's liability, the mere fact that the action was
brought "in connection with . . . [an] alleged violation" of ERISA's fiduciary
provisions arguably would support an offset against the fiduciary's own plan benefits.
The language in the Conference Committee report would restrict any offset by
requiring that "the participant's benefit in the plan be applied to satisfy the liability."
H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 757 (I997) (Con£ Rep.) (emphasis added). The actual
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Secretary of Labor or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for
the participant's breach of fiduciary responsibilities regarding the
plan. 153 The judgment, order, or settlement document must specify
that the offset is to be paid from the participant's plan benefits. 154
Additionally, the interests of a participant's spouse will only be
affected under the detailed circumstances described in the statute. 155
B.

Exceptions to Anti-Alienation Not Specifically Within the AntiAlienation Provisions-Garnishment and "Bedeviled" Eggs

1.

Federal tax liens

Failure to pay federal taxes results in a federal tax lien 156 and gives
the government the right to levy on the delinquent taxpayer's
property and property rights. 157 Although I.R.C. § 6334 exempts
specific property from levy, pension plan funds are not one of the
enumerated iterns. 158 Also, ERISA directs that "[n]othing in this
subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law of the United States .... " 159 Along

153.
154.
155.

156.

157.

158.

159.

wording of the statute, however, is not similarly restrictive, requiring only that "the
judgment, order, decree, or settlement agreement expressly provide[d] for the offset of
all or part of the amount ordered or required to be paid to the plan against the
participant's benefits provided under the plan .... " 29 U.S. C. § 1056(d)(4)(B); I.R.C.
§ 40l(a)(13)(C)(ii).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(A)(iii); I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(C)(i)(III).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(B); LR.C. § 401(a)(13)(C)(ii).
See ·29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4)(C) and I.R.C. § 40l(a)(13)(C)(iii) (directing that where
survivor annuity requirements are present, attaching a nonparticipant spouse's interest
requires written consent, an effective waiver, or the specific inclusion of the
nonparticipant spouse's interest in the judgment, order, decree, or settlement).
I.R.C. § 6321 (2006) ("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person.").
I.R.C. § 6331(a) (2006) ("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary
to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such
property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there
is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax.").
See I.R.C. § 6334(a)(l)-(7) (2006) (exempting property such as apparel, school
books, undelivered mail, and benefits for unemployment or workers' compensation,
as well as limited amounts of fuel, provisions, furniture, and books or tools needed for
the taxpayer's trade, business, or profession). While § 6334(a)(6) exempts a narrow
class of certain pension and annuity payments, ERISA-based pension benefits do not
fall within the exemption.
29 u.s.c. § 1144(d) (2006).
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with the language in the Code and ERISA, the Federal Debt
Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA) supports collection of debts owed
to the United States through "garnishment against property (including
nonexempt disposable earnings) in which the debtor has a substantial
nonexempt interest and which is in the possession, custody, or control
of a person other than the debtor, in order to satisfy the judgment
against the debtor." 160 The FDCPA's broad defmition of property
includes present and future interests, either legal or equitable, held in
any manner, and expressly embraces "spendthrift and pension
trusts. " 161
Numerous courts have considered the question of whether ERISA's
anti-alienation language precludes enforcement of a federal tax lien
against undistributed pension funds. 162 It is generally accepted that
ERISA does not hinder the government's rights to levy against a
delinquent taxpayer's interest in her pension benefits. 163 Not
surprisingly, the IRS agrees that tax liens in favor of the United
States are not subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 164 The
Service also takes the position that ERISA plans may be garnished to
satisfy federal criminal fines. 165
2.

Bankruptcy

Although a detailed examination of the interplay between ERISA
and bankruptcy laws is beyond the scope of this article, many of the
complexities and uncertainties that thrived following Patterson v.
Shumate 166 persisted for several years. One bankruptcy judge
observed that "disputes over how to construe Shumate have bedeviled

160. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(a) (2006).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(12) (2006).
162. See Mcintyre v. United States, 222 F.3d 655, 657, 660 (9th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Sawaf, 74 F.3d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1996); Shanbaum v. United States 32 F.3d 180,
183 (5th Cir. 1994); Ameritrust Co. v. Derakhshan, 830 F. Supp. 406, 409-10 (N.D.
Ohio 1993).
163. See Mcintyre, 222 F.3d at 660; Sawaf, 74 F.3d at 122-25; Shanbaum, 32 F.3d at 183;
see also Lawler v. Suntrust Sec. Inc., 740 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(commenting in a suit by an IRA owner against her financial institution for releasing
IRA funds to the IRS pursuant to levy, that "(t]he IRS has a well-grounded reputation
for being the King Kong of creditors in terms of its powers to collect tax
delinquencies.").
164. Treas. Reg.§ 1.40l(a)-13(b)(2) (as amended in 1988).
165. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200426027 (Mar. 30, 2004) (citing United States v. Tyson, 265
F. Supp. 2d 788 (E.D. Mich. 2003); United States v. Clark, No. 02-X-74872, 2003
WL 22889389 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2003); United States v. Rice, 196 F. Supp. 2d
1196, 1201 (N.D. Okla. 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200342007 (July 23, 2003).
166. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
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later cases and limited the force of the policies [relating to the
protection of pension benefits]. " 167
In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCP A) 168 included an amendment to Bankruptcy
Code § 522 that exempted "retirement funds" from bankruptcy court
claims if the funds or accounts were exempt from taxation. 169 That
Congress chose to solidify the link between alienation and tax exempt
status still begs the question of whether ''the fundamental principles
governing tax treatment of deferred compensation [are] consistent
with or even relevant to the appropriate treatment of deferred
compensation in bankruptcy." 170
IV. PURSUING RECOVERY FROM A CRIMINAL'S PENSION
BENEFITS-NOT ALL EGGS KEEP LONGER IN THE
COOLER
Recent cases have focused attention on convicted criminals'
interests in pension plan assets. In one decision, a state government
attempted to recoup its incarceration expenses from prisoners'
undistributed pension funds. 171
In other cases, the federal
government has sought to invade a criminal's pension plan to provide
restitution to the offender's victims. 172
The controversy in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cax 173 involved
several Michigan laws that required pension plans to send a
prisoner's benefit payments to the inmate's prison account, from
which the state had authority to take ninety percent of the funds to
defray the costs of incarceration. 174 The relevant Michigan statutes,
known as the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act
(SCFRA), gave the state's attorney general authority to file a
complaint in state court for reimbursement from a prisoner's assets

167. In re Handel, 301 B.R. 421,430-31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
168. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
169. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C), (d)(l2) (2006) (listing I.R.C. §§ 401 (qualified pension,
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans), 403 (taxation of employee annuities), 408
(IR.As), 408A (Roth IR.As), 414 (defmitions and special rules), 457 (deferred
compensation plans of state and local governments and tax-exempt organizations),
and 50l(a) (tax exemption for qualified retirement plan trusts) (2005)).
170. Dilley, supra note 65, at 401.
171. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 969-70 (6th Cir. 2006).
172. United States v. Novak, 441 F.3d 819, 820 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, United States v.
Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (en bane); United States v. Miller, 588 F. Supp.
2d 789, 791 (W.D. Mich. 2008).
173. Cox, 447 F.3d at 967.
174. I d. at 968-69.

88

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

for up to ninety percent of the state's "cost of care." 175 Under
SCFRA, "[a]ssets" included "property, tangible or intangible, real or
personal, belonging to or due a prisoner or former prisoner including
income or payments to such prisoner from social security, ...
pension benefits, ... annuities, retirement benefits, or from any other
source whatsoever .... " 176
The state recognized that ERISA's anti-alienation language
prohibited the state court from ordering the pension plan to send
prisoners' pension funds directly to the state. 177 Instead, the state
court ordered four prisoners with pension assets to direct their
pension plans to forward payments to the inmates' prison accounts. 178
Because the Michigan Department of Corrections restricted prisoners
from having any bank accounts other than a prison account, funds
transferred to a prison account could then be redirected by the prison
warden to the Michigan treasury. 179 When three inmates refused to
notify DaimlerChrysler to forward their pension benefit payments to
the prison for deposit in the prison accounts, the attorney general
advised DaimlerChrysler to send the pension checks to the prisoners
at their prison addresses. 180 DaimlerChrysler did not comply with the
state's notices, but instead sought a declaratory judgment in federal
district court as to its obligations regarding the state's attempted
diversion ofthe prisoners' pension funds. 181
The district court determined that the state court's orders and the
state's notices were rendered invalid by ERISA's anti-alienation
provision. 182 On review, the appeals court affirmed the district
court's judgment, concluding that delivery of the pension funds to the
prisoners' institutional addresses was "a mere formalism . . . not
dispositive of whether an alienation ha[d] occurred." 183 The court
noted that its ruling did not bar Michigan's right to reimbursement;

175. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 800.403(3), .404(1) (West 1998); Cox, 447 F.3d at 96869.
176. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.40l(a) (West 1998).
177. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 7, Cox v. DaimlerChrysler, 127 S. Ct. 2971
(2006) (No. 06-273).
178. Cox, 447 F.3d at 968-69.
I 79. !d. at 969-70.
180. !d. at 970.
181. /d. at 970, 975. DaimlerChrysler argued that the Michigan laws were preempted by
ERISA's anti-alienation provision, as well as the general preemption provision
contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Id at 972.
182. Id at 971.
183. Id at 975-76.

2009]

Balancing ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provisions

89

the state remained free to proceed against pension funds after the
prisoners received them. 184
Although Cox prevented a state court from encumbering
undistributed pension plan funds, 185 the federal government has fared
better in its attempts to garnish pension accounts. In addition to the
federal government's rights to reach plan assets to satisfy fmes and
tax liens, 186 courts generally have interpreted the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MYRA) as an exception to ERISA's ban on
assignment and alienation. 187 The recent en bane decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Novak 188 illustrates the arguments for and against applying MYRA
to enforce restitution orders against pension plan benefits. 189
Raymond Novak worked as director of telecommunications for
Robinsons-May Department Stores (May Company) from 1990 to
2000, during which time he participated in May Company's
retirement and profit sharing plans. 190 Novak's then-wife, Norma
Ortega Nance, worked for Nestle U.S.A., Inc. (Nestle), in a position
where her duties involved access to telephone equipment. 191 Over a
four-year period, the couple engaged in a scheme whereby Norma
ordered $3.3 million worth of telephone boards for Nestle and passed
them on to her husband, who then sold the equipment and pocketed
the proceeds. 192 Novak pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport
stolen goods 193 and filing a false tax return, 194 was sentenced to 24
months in prison, and was ordered to pay restitution of over $3.3
184. !d. at 976. Concluding that ERISA's anti-alienation provision prohibited SCFRA's
garnishment procedures, the Sixth Circuit declined to reach the question of whether
the Michigan statute also was barred by ERISA's general preemption provision, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a). Id
185. Id
186. See discussion supra Part III.B.l.
187. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Himebaugh, No. 02-CR-0077-022-CVE, 2007 WL 1462430, at *2 (N.D. Okla. May
17, 2007); United States v. First Bank & Trust E. Tex., 477 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780-81
(E.D. Tex. 2007); United States v. Wahlen, 459 F. Supp. 2d 800, 822 (E.D. Wis.
2006); United States v. Lazorwitz, 411 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636-37 (E.D.N.C. 2005);
United States v. James, 312 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805 (E.D. Va. 2004); In re True, 340
B.R. 597, 602 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006).
188. 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
189. Id at 1043.
190. United States v. Novak, 441 F.3d 819, 820 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 476 F.3d 1041
(9th Cir. 2007) (en bane).
191. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043.
192. Id
193. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
194. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2006).
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million. 195 The restitution order in Novak was premised on the
MYRA, which provides in part:
Civil remedies for satisfaction of an unpaid fme
(a) ENFORCEMENT.-The United States may enforce a
judgment imposing a fme in accordance with the practices
and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment
under Federal law or State law. Notwithstanding any other
Federal law (including section 207 of the Social Security
Act), a judgment imposing a fme may be enforced against
all property or rights to property of the person fmed, except
that(1) property exempt from levy for taxes pursuant to section

6334(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (12) ofthe
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be exempt from
enforcement ofthe judgment under Federal law;
(2) section 3014 of chapter 176 of title 28 shall not apply to
enforcement under Federal law; and
(3) the provisions of section 303 of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1673) shall apply to enforcement
of the judgment under Federal law or State law. 196
Novak opposed the government's efforts to garnish his pension
funds, relying on ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 197
The district court quashed the writ of garnishment and the
government appealed. 198 Following reversal by a divided panel of the
Ninth Circuit, 199 the appellate court concluded in a divided en bane
opinion that the MYRA reflected a congressional intent of allowing
alienation of ERISA-covered retirement funds to satisfy MYRAbased criminal restitution orders.Z00 In balancing MYRA's statutory
purpose ofholding offenders accountable to compensate their victims
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043.
18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (2006).
Novak,476F.3dat 1044.
!d.

!d.
/d. at 1044, 1047-49.
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in an amount that reflects the impact of the criminal activity01 with
the Supreme Court's conclusion that ERISA required holding
retirement funds "inviolate" until retirement/02 the court engaged in a
detailed discussion of these two competing provisions. 203
The court began its opinion with a nod to the competing policies
underlying MYRA and ERISA: the "MYRA rests on the recognition
that '[i]t is essential that the criminal justice system recognize the
impact that crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible,
ensure that [the] offender be held accountable to repay these
costs. "'204 On the other hand, "ERISA is meant to assure that
'[r]etirement funds shall remain inviolate until retirement."' 205 Other
than a quotation from the Supreme Court's decision in Guidry206 that
ERISA "[s]ection 206(d) reflects a considered congressional policy
choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners ...
and their dependents ... ,"207 the majority continued for 20 more
pages without analyzing or even mentioning the divergent policies at
the crux of the case.
One aspect of apparent significance to the majority's analysis
involved the use of the word "notwithstanding" in the MYRA's
enforcement provision:
The United States may enforce a judgment imposing a fme
in accordance with the practices and procedures for the
enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State
law. Notwithstanding any other Federal law (including
section 207 of the Social Security Act), a judgment imposing
a fine may be enforced against all property or rights to
property of the person fmed, except that- (1) property
exempt from [tax levies under specified I.R.C. provisions]
shall be exempt [from MYRA]; (2) [FDCPA exemption
procedures shall be inapplicable]; and (3) ... Consumer
Credit Protection Act [provisions limiting disposable

201. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 18 (1995).
202. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 851 (1997) (quoting
JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 547
(2d ed. 1995))).
203. See id. at 1043.
204. I d. (quoting S. REP. No. 104-179, at 18 (1995)).
205. ld. at 1043 (quoting Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851 (quoting JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A
WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 547 (2d ed. 1995))) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
206. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'I Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365,376 (1990).
207. Novak, 476 F.3d at 1045-46 (quoting Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376).
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earnings garnishment] shall apply to enforcement of the
judgment under Federal law or State law. 208
By using the term "notwithstanding," the majority determined that
Congress swept away all conflicting laws, including ERISA's antialienation provision, insofar as such laws were at odds with the
MVRA.2o9

In a brief consideration of the background leading up to the
enactment of the MVRA, the court noted Senator John McCain's
concern that the version of the MYRA bill under consideration did
not include an amendment to ERISA that would permit garnishing
pension plans to provide restitution to victims of crimes. 210 The
conclusion drawn by the majority, however, was that Senator
McCain's concern, together with Judiciary Committee Chairman
Orrin Hatch's response that the committee would consider his points,
indicated that the MYRA's "notwithstanding" phrase was meant to
establish the MVRA as an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation
provision. 211 With the exception of a short look at some of the
MYRA's legislative history, 212 the majority opinion primarily parsed
the language of the conflicting statutes with very limited examination
of the underlying policies and purposes. The opinion did recognize
that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence forbade the judicial creation
of implied exceptions to ERISA's prohibition on alienation or
assignment of pension benefits. 213 However, by construing the
MVRA as an express exception to ERISA's alienation language, 214
the court side-stepped the need to explain why the MYRA's policy of
compensating victims should take precedence over ERISA's policy
of safeguarding pension benefits.
The Novak dissent chastised the majority for trying to resolve
ambiguities in the MYRA when the court's limited role should have
been deciding whether the MYRA "evinces an unmistakable
intention to override ERISA's anti-alienation provision." 215 With
regard to legislative history, the dissent did not view Senator
McCain's concerns with creating a crime victim restitution exception
to ERISA as support for the theory that the MYRA's

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

1045 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (2006)).
1046-50.
1051.
1051-52.
See id. at 1051.
/d. at 1054-55.
/d. at 1052-53.
/d. at I 064 (Fletcher, J ., dissenting).

Id.
Jd.
/d.
/d.

at
at
at
at
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"notwithstanding" clause embodied such congressional intent. 216 To
the contrary, none of Senator McCain's detailed amendments to the
tax and labor provisions ofERISA were enacted. 217 Additionally, the
year following passage of the MYRA, Congress actually amended
ERISA through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA) to add an
anti-alienation exception to ERISA for claims against a pension plan
based on breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the plan. 218 The Senate
Report on the TRA noted that ERISA lacked any exception that
''would permit the offset of a participant's benefit against the amount
owed to a plan by the participant as a result of a breach of fiduciary
duty to the plan or criminality involving the plan .... " 219 If the
MYRA, passed in 1996, really did create an ERISA anti-alienation
exception to allow recovery from a participant whose "criminality
involv[ed] the plan," it seems unlikely that in 1997, the House and
Senate Reports would have stated the opposite.
As discussed above, the 1997 ERISA amendments that exclude
offsets for crimes or breaches of fiduciary duty owed to the plan
contain detailed and explicit requirements. 220 In comparison, the
MYRA's "notwithstanding" clause is relatively bare. 221 According to
the Novak dissent, "the majority creates a world in which it is more
difficult to attach the ERISA-covered pension benefits of individuals
who have committed crimes against pension funds than it is to
garnish the ERISA-covered benefits of individuals who have
committed other offenses. " 222
Comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in Novak
underscores the difficulty of trying to impute a single legislative
purpose to two coordinate legislative bodies comprised of over 500
individuals. 223
The majority opmton might constitute an
impermissible departure from Guidry; as pointed out by the dissent, if
Congress wanted assignment and alienation exceptions beyond
QDROs and recoveries for wrongs against the plan itself, such
exceptions should have been drafted to clearly indicate an abrogation

216.
217.
218.
219.

220.
221.
222.
223.

!d. at 1065.
!d.
See discussion supra Part lli.A.4.
REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1997, S. REP. No. 105-33, at 310 (1997), quoted in
Novak, 476 F.3d at 1072 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also H.R REP. No. 105-220, at
756-57 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
See discussion supra Part lli.A.4.
Novak, 476 F.3d at 1072-73 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
!d. at 1073.
Compare id. at 1041-64 (majority opinion), with id. at 1064-77 (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
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of ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 224 Still, the majority arguably
accomplishes a gut-level result that just seems fair: providing crime
victims with a means of recovery even if the criminal has nothing but
pension plan assets. After all, depending on the sentence imposed,
the criminal might never be able to use his pension funds. The
obvious problem with such reasoning is that it ignores the Supreme
Court's repeated admonitions against climbing the slippery slope of
equity to judicially craft ERISA anti-alienation exceptions. 225
Even more recently, a district court rejected a convicted criminal's
attempt to invoke the protection of ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions to shield pension benefits from the MVRA. 226 In United
States v. Miller, 227 the owners and operators of an adult care facility
defrauded one of the facility's elderly residents. 228 Defendant Charles
Miller entered a plea of guilty to charges that included conspiracy to
commit bank fraud, identity theft, access fraud, and mail fraud. 229
Following entry of a restitution order of almost $150,000, the United
States Attorney sought to garnish Miller's $1,715.72 monthly pension
benefit. 230 Miller's objections to garnishment included an argument
that ERISA's spendthrift provisions prohibited the government from
seizing any portion of his pension benefits. 231 The Magistrate's
report and recommendations, which the district court adopted, 232
relied in large measure on the Ninth Circuit's en bane decision in
Novak, particularly the court's holding that the MVRA allowed
garnishment of pension benefits where the "defendant has a current,
unilateral right to receive payments under the terms of the retirement
plan."233 The district judge noted that the court was joining
"'[d]istrict courts across the country... "' in refusing to regard

224. The Novak majority opinion gains no support from the Pension Protection Act of2006
(PPA), Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). In this highly publicized pension reform
enactment, the only reference to ERISA's anti-alienation provision involves a
direction to the Department of Labor to issue regulations regarding the timing and
modification ofQDROs. See Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1001, 120 Stat. at 1052-53.
225. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,447 (1999); Patterson v. Shumate,
504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'! Pension Fund, 493
U.S. 365, 375-76 (1990).
226. United States v. Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d 789, 797 (W.D. Mich. 2008).
227. 588 F. Supp. 2d 789.
228. !d. at 791.
229. !d.
230. !d. at 791-92.
231. !d. at 791.
232. !d. at 792-93.
233. Miller, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (quoting Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043).
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ERISA' s anti-alienation provision as an impediment to garnishing a
criminal's pension plan distributions where the MVRA created an
exception to anti-alienation. 234
As observed by the district court judge in Novak, the federal circuit
and district courts have presented a relatively unified front in treating
the MYRA as an express exception to ERISA's spendthrift
provisions. 235 The difficulty with such an assault is that, despite its
apparent logic and arguable fairness, the courts nevertheless are
filling in the legislative gaps to write an MYRA-based exception to
ERISA. Careful reading of the majority's en bane opinion in Novak
reveals that the textual underpinning for its decision is premised to an
extraordinary degree on the MYRA's assertion that its application is
"[n]otwithstanding any other Federal law."236 Given the Supreme
Court's past insistence on express congressional exceptions to
ERISA's spendthrift provisions, it seems likely that such gap-filling
would be declared invalid.
V. QUARRELS AND ADDLED EGGS 237-THE ELEPHANT IN
THE ROOM-WITH AN EGG
Equity considerations persistently creep into ERISA's bar on
assignment and alienation. 238 In spite of the Supreme Court's
prohibition against equitable tinkering, 239 significant numbers of the
remaining judiciary whose chambers are not one block east of the
Capitol appear unable to resist the lure of attempting to do justice.
Combating this occupational hazard seems to be a difficult task,
particularly when a victim's restitutionary rights are at stake. But one
person's leafy ground cover may be someone else's kudzu. As
Justice Blackmun cautioned more than once, ERISA's anti-alienation
provision "'reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a
decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their
dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are, blameless), even if
that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done
them. "' 240
234. !d. at 796.
235. United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1044-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (en bane).
236. !d.
237. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET 130, act 3, sc. I (Alan Durband, ed.,
Barron's Educational Series, Inc. 1984) ("Thy head is as full of quarrels as an egg is
full of meat, and yet thy head hath been beaten as addle as an egg for quarrelling.").
238. See, e.g., Novak, 476 F.3d at 1045-46.
239. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
240. Patterson v. Shumante, 504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992) (quoting Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376);
see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,447 (1999).
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The facts in Novak underscore Justice Blackmun's caution because
there are few reasons to sympathize with Raymond Novak or his exwife: two white-collar criminals who got caught. 241 As an almost
instinctive reaction, many people (regardless of legal training) would
fmd it fair and proper to deprive this greedy pair of their pensions,
even though the relevant decisions say nothing about whether the
Novaks had innocent dependents who might be forced to suffer too.
In a case such as Novak, where criminals defrauded a business but
did no direct harm to individuals, it becomes somewhat difficult to
articulate the policy supporting restitution. Depleting Novak's
retirement accounts will make his ex-wife's former employer, Nestle
Food Company, wealthier by the approximately $140,000 in Novak's
fully vested pension benefit with May Company's retirement and
profit-sharing plans-a mere pittance for Nestle. Upon closer
consideration, it might seem as if society is exalting punishment as
the prevailing policy, rather than preserving retirement assets or even
compensating victims. Perhaps the facile slide from restitution to
retribution is part ofwhat worried Justice Blackmun in Guidry. 242
Meanwhile, Nestle's shareholders, officers, directors, employees,
and perhaps creditors likely would be appalled if anyone suggested
protecting Novak's retirement assets, even though they were worth
only approximately $140,000-after all, the Novaks' scheme cost
Nestle over $3.3 million. 243 If the anti-alienation provisions were
construed too broadly and thereby protected individual retirees'
pension funds to the detriment of a corporation or its creditors, every
employee with larcenous propensities would receive the resultant
message as if it were printed in the company newsletter. Allowing
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions to eclipse the MYRA might
obscure some ofthe deterrent effect ofhaving to make restitution. In
addition, ERISA's legislative history declared its "most important
purpose" to be "assur[ing] American workers ... [the ability to] look
forward with anticipation to a retirement with financial security and
dignity, and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the
necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society. " 244
Holding criminals fmancially accountable could help further fmancial
security of the non-criminal element, while "restor[ing] credibility
and faith in the private pension plans .... "245

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

476 F.3d at 1043.
See Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376-77.
Novak, 476 F.3d at 1043-44.
S. REP. No. 93-127, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. 4838,4849.
/d.
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Using the MVRA to create an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation
provision also could strengthen ERISA's goal of protecting pensions.
By forcing the criminal to bear the burden of his crimes without any
protection for his pension plan assets, society might reduce the risksharing that otherwise would be borne by innocent victims. Assume
that Cl criminal cleverly filled her retirement plans coffers, but
retained few liquid assets. Failing to require the criminal to use
pension funds to reimburse her victim could adversely affect the
victim's own non-retirement savings-thus eroding the third leg of
the victim's retirement fund stool. To the extent that the victim
lacked sufficient assets to compensate for her fmancial loss, the
federal fisc likely would be called on to underwrite the victim's loss
from criminal activity. Naturally, a contrary argument could be made
that the government would similarly have to subsidize the criminal's
retirement if her pension and private savings were to be depleted for
restitution.
An additional question involves examining why the ability to
invade a miscreant's retirement fund should depend on the existence
of a federal criminal adjudication, rather than a state court conviction.
Victims have little if any say as to which arm of the government
chooses to prosecute?46 It is difficult to imagine a policy that would
support restitution to the victim when the United States Attorney
elects to proceed with a case, but no restitution if an equivalent crime
with concurrent state jurisdiction is handled by the state prosecutor.
The basic premise of retirement income security involves two
components: ( 1) a minimum standard of living, and (2) lifestyle
maintenance. 247 Typically Social Security is cited as the source of the
basic life needs, while retirement plans and personal savings are seen
as providing augmenting funds to enable the retirees to maintain or
approach a pre-retirement lifestyle. 248 In view of these two levels of
funding, which might be thought of as "base" and "surplus," it seems
curious that alienation of a criminal's pension plan assets has been
approached consistently as an aU-or-nothing proposition.
As
indicated above, unless the driving policy in alienation of otherwise
protected retirement funds is retribution, there is little reason to
design a system for accessing a convicted criminal's retirement assets
around the criminal's lifestyle. Although the criminal's retirement
means should be a consideration, it should be an ancillary concern
when compared to her victim's needs.

246. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2006).
247. Eason, supra note 4, at 177.
248. See id. at 184.
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Finally, since its enactment, .ERISA has allowed participant plan
loans. 249 Regardless of whether the MVRA or an equivalent law is
ever modified to encompass state court restitution orders, plan
participants frequently have rather extensive rights to draw on their
plan benefits prior to retirement. 250 Although the tax penalty can be
substantial, pre-retirement plan participants have the flexibility to use
the funds if necessary. 251 If a criminal participant is free to borrow
against her plan to buy a Porsche or add a home theatre to her
summer cottage, it is difficult to explain why the legal system should
not be able to "require" that same individual to borrow from plan
assets to pay restitution. If a MVRA case reaches the Supreme Court
and a majority of the Justices agrees with the type of reasoning
expressed by the Novak dissent/52 these questions could be more
than just idle curiosities.
Senator McCain's proposed legislation provided a comprehensive
and effective amendment to ERISA that would have established a
criminal restitution exception to ERISA' s anti-alienation provision. 253

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (2006).
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See 29 U.S.C. § ll08(b)(l) (2006); I.R.C. § 72(p)(l)(A) (2006).
United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1064-77 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
S. 1570, I 04th Cong. (1996):
(l) IN GENERAL-Section 206(d) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. l056(d)) is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
'(4)(A) Paragraph (I) shall not apply to a qualified criminal
restitution order and each pension plan shall provide for payments
in accordance with the applicable requirements of a qualified
criminal restitution order.
'(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'qualified
criminal restitution order' means a judgment, order, or decree-'(i) which is issued by a Federal or State court in connection
with a criminal conviction of a participant under a plan,
'(ii) which imposes a criminal fine on the participant or
which requires the participant to make restitution to I or more
victims of the crime for which convicted,
'(iii)(Q which creates or recognizes a right to attach all or a
portion of the benefits payable with respect to the participant
under a plan, or
'(II) which ~eates or recognizes the existence of a victim's
right to, or assigns to a victim the right to, receive all or a part of
those benefits, and
'(iv) with respect to which the requirements of
subparagraphs (C) and (D) of paragraph (3) are met (determined
after application of paragraph (3)(E)), except that in applying such
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subparagraphs, the term 'criminal restitution order' shall be
substituted for the term 'domestic relations order'.
'(C) The requirements of subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) of
paragraph (3) shall apply to any plan administrator or fiduciary of
a plan to which this paragraph applies.
'(D) Rules similar to the rules of subparagraph (J) and (N)
of paragraph (3) shall apply for purposes of this paragraph.'
(2) PREEMPTION-Paragraph (7) of section 514(b) of
such Act (29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(7)) is amended by inserting "or to
qualified criminal restitution orders (within the meaning of
section 206(d)(3)(B))" before the period at the end.
(b) AMENDMENTS TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1986(1) IN GENERAL-Paragraph (13) of section 401(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to assignment of
benefits) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
'(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
ORDERS- Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a qualified
criminal restitution order (within the meaning of section 414(u)).'
(2) QUALIFIED CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDERSection 414 of such Code is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
'(u) QUALIFIED CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDERFor purposes of this title'(I) IN GENERAL-The term 'qualified criminal
restitution order' means a judgment, order, or decree'(A) which is issued by a Federal or State court in
connection with a criminal conviction of a participant under a
plan,
'(B) which imposes a criminal fine on the participant or
which requires the participant to make restitution to I or more
victims of the crime for which convicted,
'(C)(i) which creates or recognizes a right to attach all or a
portion of the benefits payable with respect to the participant
under a plan, or
'(ii) which creates or recognizes the existence of a victim's
right to, or assigns to a victim the right to, receive all or a part of
those benefits, and
'(D) with respect to which the requirements of paragraphs
(2) and (3) of subsection (p) are met (determined after application
of subsection (p )(4)), except that in applying such paragraphs, the
term 'criminal restitution order' shall be substituted for the term
'domestic relations order'.
'(2) PLAN AND FIDUCIARY-The provisions of
paragraphs (6) and (7) of subsection (p) shall apply to any plan
administrator or fiduciary of a plan to which this paragraph
applies.
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Congress should enact a provision such as that introduced by Senator
McCain. Failing to do so will ensure years of future ambiguity over
whether the MYRA really creates an exception to ERISA's
spendthrift provisions. Victims deserve better.
VI. CONCLUSION
ERISA reflects a congressional policy of providing significant
protection to a broad range of retirement benefits. The ERISA antialienation provisions have made plan participants' assets difficult, if
not nearly impossible at times, to access prior to retirement.
Although the statutory exceptions to anti-alienation have grown over
the years, the circumstances under which plan participants, the
federal government, the plans themselves, and third parties are able to
invade the plan are still quite limited.
Despite the Supreme Court's repeated refusal to allow application
of equitable principles to the alienation of plan funds, lower courts
continue to inject their own concepts of fairness into decisions
concerning plan benefit alienation. The result is that participants,
practitioners, and third parties are faced with real uncertainty in many
situations involving the alienability of a criminal's pension assets.
Instead of a system of bright-line rules, pension alienation
determinations frequently depend on tortured readings of statutes and
inconsistent policy approaches.
As long as the courts avoid
'(3) SPECIAL RULES-Rules similar to the rules of
paragraphs (9), (10), (11), and (12) of subsection (p) shall apply
for purposes of this subsection.'
(3) TAX TREATMENT OF DISTRIBUTIONS(A) Section 402(e)(1) is amended by adding the end [sic]
the following new subparagraph:
'(C) CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDERS-Rules similar
to the rules of subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall apply to payments
or distributions to victims of a criminal offense pursuant to a
qualified criminal restitution order described in section 414(u).'
(B) Section 72(m)(10) is amended(i) by adding at the end the following new sentence: "The
preceding sentence shall also apply to payments or distributions
made to victims of a criminal offense pursuant to a qualified
criminal restitution order described in section 414(u).", and
(ii) by inserting "or qualified criminal restitution orders"
after "orders" in the heading.
(C) Subparagraph (J) of section 402(d)(4) is amended by
adding at the end the following new sentence: "This subparagraph
shall also apply to any distributions or payments to victims of a
criminal offense pursuant to a qualified criminal restitution order
described in section 414(u)."
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discussing or analyzing the competing policy interests at stake, the
contours of alienation will remain vague and somewhat
unpredictable.
Congress twice amended ERISA's spendthrift provision, creating
exceptions for QDR0s 254 and for fiduciary breaches involving
pension plans. 255 Although courts have treated the MYRA as an
exception to ERISA's prohibition against alienation of plan
benefits/ 56 the legal support for such treatment is questionable at
best. Congress should recognize that victims of criminal activity
deserve to recover from the pension plans of those who have harmed
them. Enacting appropriate legislation to accomplish this result
would be relatively straightforward and would foster predictability
and fairness.

254. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A); I.R.C. § 401(a)(l3)(B) (2006).
255. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4); I.R.C. § 401(a)(l3)(C).
256. See. e.g., United States v. Jaffe, 417 F.3d 259, 266-67 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Himebaugh, No. 02-CR-0077-002-CVE, 2007 WL 1462430 (N.D. Okla. May 17,
2007).

